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Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- FIGURES -- TABLES -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION -- Chapter 2. THE INTERWAR GOLD STANDARD -- Chapter 3. THE DETERMINANTS OF EXTERNAL IMBALANCE -- Chapter 4. DEVALUATION -- Chapter 5. FRANCE, 1924-1927 -- Chapter 6. TARIFF PROTECTION -- Chapter 7. DEFICITS DURING DEPRESSION: BRITAIN, BELGIUM, AND FRANCE IN THE THIRTIES -- Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix I. GENERAL DATA APPENDIX -- Appendix II. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE DATA -- SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

"This volume argues that international human rights law has made positive contribution to the realization of human rights in much of the world. Although governments sometimes ratify human rights treaties, gambling that they will experience little pressure to comply with them, this is not typically the case. Focusing on rights stakeholders rather than the United Nations or state pressure, Beth A. Simmons demonstrates through a combination of statistical analyses and case studies that the ratification of treaties leads to better rights practices on average." "By several measures, civil and political rights, women's rights, a right not to be tortured in government detention, and children's rights improve, especially in the very large heterogeneous set of countries that are neither stable autocracies nor stable democracies. Simmons argues that international human rights law should get more practical and rhetorical support from the international community as a supplement to broader efforts to address conflict, development, and democratization."--Jacket

Central bank cooperation depends on a few crucial parameters: the extent to which central bankers agree on theory (end means relationships); the extent to which they can agree on goals (social purpose); the capacity (technical and institutional) to achieve their collective goals; and whether the broader political environment facilitates or impedes cooperation. This article explores these questions by first providing an overview of central banks and bankers. Among the G-10 countries, central bankers are likely to share political independence, relatively long term horizons, and (increasingly) academic backgrounds. These conditions may be conducive to high levels of cooperation in the future. Second, I explore the "easiest" form of cooperation -- information sharing -- and conclude that this is an area in which central bank cooperation will become increasingly routinised. Cooperation to address global financial stability is a more difficult cooperative dilemma, with tensions between the need for efficient regulatory management and the inclusion of a broader range of cooperating institutions. In the area of exchange rate and monetary policy coordination, consensus among the major exchange rate authorities regarding the effectiveness of coordinated exchange market interventions has withered, though this does not preclude a new consensus from emerging in the future. One of the most significant challenges to central bank cooperation in the future will be how to include rising monetary and financial powers, particularly China, into the cooperative management of international monetary conditions

The modern human rights movement is at a critical juncture in its history. It has been nearly seventy years since the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and some of the oldest and most active human rights organizations have been operating around the world for about forty years. More than twenty years have passed since the end of the cold war, and the time when people spoke in triumphal terms of the global success of Western values is now a fading memory. International human rights are ensconced as firmly as ever in international law and institutions, but what about the future of the "human rights movement"?

The regime for international investment is extraordinary in public international law and controversial in many regions of the world. This article explores two aspects of this set of rules: its decentralization and the unusual powers it gives to private actors to invoke dispute settlement. Decentralization has contributed to a competitive environment for ratification of bilateral investment treaties (bit s) and has elevated the importance of dyadic bargaining power in the formation of the regime. Governments of developing countries are more likely to enter into bit s and tie their hands more tightly when they are in a weak bargaining position, which in turn is associated with economic downturns of the domestic economy. Once committed, investors have sued governments with surprising regularity, arguably contributing disproportionately to legal awards that favor the private corporate actors who have the power to convene the dispute settlement system. States have begun to push back, revising their obligations and attempting to annul arbitral awards. One of the conclusions is that it is important not only to consider whether bit s attract capital-which has been the focus of nearly all the empirical research on bit effects-but also to investigate the governance consequences of the international investment regime generally. (World Politics / SWP)